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Abstract
Disease outbreaks in U.S. animal livestock industries have economic
impacts measured in hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Biosecurity,
or procedures intended to protect animals against disease, is known to be
effective at reducing infection risk at facilities. Yet to the detriment of
animal health, humans do not always follow biosecurity protocols. Human
behavioral factors have been shown to influence willingness to follow biose-
curity protocols. Here we show how social cues may affect cooperation
with a biosecurity practice. Participants were immersed in a simulated
swine production facility through a graphical user interface and prompted
to make a decision that addressed their willingness to comply with a biose-
curity practice. We tested the effect of varying three experimental vari-
ables: (1) the risk of acquiring an infection, (2) the delivery method of the
infection risk information (numerical versus graphical), and (3) behavior
of an automated coworker in the facility. We provide evidence that par-
ticipants changed their behavior when they observed a simulated worker
making a choice to follow or not follow a biosecurity protocol, even though
the simulated worker had no economic effect on the participants’ payouts.
These results advance the understanding of human behavioral effects on
biosecurity protocol decisions; demonstrating that social cues need to be
considered by livestock facility managers when developing policies to make
agricultural systems more disease resilient.
1 Introduction
Endemic and emergent diseases remain a constant threat to the animal and eco-
nomic welfare of the livestock industry. A national survey of U.S. hog producers
found that from 2014-2017, 54.3% reported having suffered an outbreak of Porcine
reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSv), and 43.9% reported un-
dergoing an outbreak of Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDv). [1] Annual eco-
nomic losses due to PRRSv and PEDv are estimated at $580.62 million [2], and
upwards of $900 million [3], respectively. Animal health issues become even more
pronounced considering the current threat of African swine fever, a highly viru-
lent disease that can cause up to 100% fatality in pigs. [4] Furthermore, analysis
of consumer preferences indicates that animal welfare is an important attribute
to some consumers of livestock products. [5] During disease outbreaks, public
concerns related to food safety can cause reductions in pork consumption, which
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carries economic ramifications for the swine industry. Implementation of biose-
curity best management organizational policies is critical to effectively prevent or
control outbreaks of existing and emerging virulent diseases. [6]
Human behavioral factors that can influence biosecurity implementation have
been identified as crucial to mitigating the risk of outbreaks; although limited
knowledge exists on the actual relationship between these factors and behav-
ior. [7, 8] Analysis of human-behavior can be undertaken in contexts of varying
scope: strategic, tactical, and operational. [9] Taking a broad view, big picture
strategic decisions are guided by long-term objectives. Biosecurity issues at the
strategic scale are often related to network interactions of facilities and service
providers across production chains. The emergent behavior of networks, an im-
portant consideration of strategic policy makers, is intrinsically related to more
localized tactical decisions that are made within a specified region. At the tac-
tical level, farm managers decide whether or not to invest in and implement
preventive biosecurity protocols. From a narrower, more localized perspective,
operational level biosecurity can be viewed as a continuous series of decisions
made by production workers indicating their willingness to follow or comply with
biosecurity protocols (hereafter referred to as compliance with biosecurity). [10]
The operational, tactical, and strategic levels of biosecurity are interconnected,
for example, tactical decision-making influences operational level protocols. And
while it is known that operational level compliance with biosecurity will impact
the implementation and efficacy of tactical and strategic biosecurity decisions,
limited feedback describing operational level behavior is currently available to
inform tactical and strategic level decision-making.
Compliance with biosecurity, such as consistently following sanitation proto-
cols before entering a production facility, has been reported to significantly reduce
disease. [11–13] Unfortunately, poor compliance with biosecurity is an endemic
problem in many animal production systems. A detailed questionnaire of 60
Swedish farrow-to-finish herds found that particular biosecurity measures were
applied for visitors in more than half of farms; but those same measures were
carried out by farmers and staff themselves on only 32% of farms. [14] Hidden
cameras at Quebec poultry farms documented 44 different biosecurity lapses made
by workers and visitors over a four-week period. [15] Workers may be exposed to
a variety of information about the consequences of a facility infection; but they
balance the cost of infection with complacency and a tendency to become lax in
day-to-day activities. This relaxation of biosecurity effort has been examined from
a temporal perspective, with evidence suggesting that people view the likelihood
and impact of an event to be reduced as time since the event increases. [16–18]
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Referred to as temporally-based psychological distancing, the farther in the past
an event occurs, the less likely and impactful such an event is perceived to be.
Pressure to complete work efficiently with time constraints has created scenarios
where workers find it unrealistically challenging to complete their job while com-
plying with biosecurity standards. [19] A better understanding of the complex
human decision-making process that influences workers’ willingness to comply
with biosecurity protocols requires innovative research approaches and data col-
lection techniques that can provide novel feedback for tactical and strategic level
decision makers.
Studies of human behavioral strategies have applied serious games developed
for data collection or education as early as 1962 for designing robot mining simu-
lations. [20] Experimental economic games are a particular type of serious game
in which participants are incentivized with monetary payouts. Performance-
based incentives are known to increase engagement and salience in decision-
making. [21–23] Indeed, Holt & Laury found in their multiple price lottery ex-
periment that risk aversion increased when human subjects were faced with real
financial incentives. [24] Computer-based simulations provide a unique opportu-
nity to study the mechanics of decision-making in a controlled environment. [25]
Experiments utilizing computer software have had success amongst adolescents,
increasing empathy [26], as well as awareness of substance use [27]. Within the
domain of animal biosecurity, serious games have explored the effects of informa-
tion awareness and audience on tactical investments [28,29], as well as the effects
of message delivery method on operational compliance [30].
Recent research conducted by Merrill et al. [30] utilized an experimental sim-
ulation of a livestock production facility to examine factors that may influence
perception of disease risk, thus affecting biosecurity compliance. Their experi-
mental treatment variables included: information regarding disease infection risk,
uncertainty associated with disease infection risk information, and the message
delivery method used to communicate disease infection risk. These factors have
been identified as important within the farmer biosecurity decision-making pro-
cess. [7,31] Research has suggested that farmers in the United States exhibit risk
tolerance [32], but they may be more likely to implement or comply with biose-
curity as their perceived risk of infection increases [6, 28, 33]. Indeed, Merrill et
al. [30] found that as the actual infection risk within the experimental simula-
tion increased, so did compliance with a biosecurity practice. The certainty of
infection risk information is also expected to affect biosecurity implementation
and compliance [6]; although the effect may change depending on the domain of
interest, i.e. tactical versus operational. Merrill et al. [28] found that in a tactical
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experimental simulation of disease in a swine production region, an increase in
disease risk certainty was associated with increased biosecurity implementation.
However, in an operational experimental simulation of a single livestock produc-
tion facility, an increase in certainty was associated with decreased biosecurity
compliance. [30] The opposite responses to increases in disease risk certainty at
the tactical and operational levels highlights the complexity of human behavior,
and the need to provide operational feedback to tactical and strategic decision
makers which is currently unavailable.
Another factor that is expected to impact compliance with biosecurity proto-
cols is the message delivery method when communicating disease risk level. [34]
The method of delivering a message is important because humans exhibit affective
reasoning: feelings and initial reaction to stimuli guide decision-making. [35, 36]
Additionally, messaging affects the balance of experiential and analytical reason-
ing in the processing of statistical information. [37] Humans rely on a limited
number of mental heuristics, or ways to reduce problem complexity, when pre-
sented with decisions under uncertainty. [38] Visual or graphical communication
of risk can be advantageous in attracting and holding attention. [34] Indeed, Mer-
rill et al. [30] found that risk information delivered in a graphical format was more
effective in increasing biosecurity compliance, with respect to messages delivered
in a numeric or linguistic format.
Contextual and situational factors also determine how probability is under-
stood. [39, 40] Generally, humans underestimate risks that occur frequently [41],
and discount the risk of an event if the probability is low [42]. However, the exact
definition of low is malleable and subjective, as it can change depending on con-
text. Humans utilize mental shortcuts when making decisions with limited time.
One such common heuristic is referred to as anchoring and adjustment. [38] The
following example illustrates how the formulation of a problem can profoundly
impact the final answer. When two groups of high school students were asked to
estimate a numerical expression within 5 seconds, they used extrapolation and
adjustment to formulate their answer under time pressure. The first group, when
asked to estimate 1× 2× 3× 4× 5× 6× 7× 8 yielded a median estimate of 512;
while the second group, presented with the expression 8×7×6×5×4×3×2×1
yielded a median estimate of 2,250. [38] Although the correct answer is 40,320 in
both cases, changing the initial point of reference completely alters the result of
the off-hand mental calculation.
In this study we expand upon the work of Merrill et al. [30] by introducing
a novel variable to treat: information about social cues in a production facil-
ity. Response to social cues is grounded in social value orientation, the weight
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given by an individual to their own welfare, and the welfare of their interaction
partner, in evaluation of the desirability of a particular outcome. Predicting be-
havior is challenging when the same social cue can be interpreted as an incentive
or a deterrent. Individuals who assign positive weights to partners’ welfare are
classified as pro-social. Those who assign negative value or do not assign any
value to their partners’ welfare are characterized as pro-selves. Where pro-social
individuals can interpret a behavior as a reflection of good intentions, pro-self
individuals value only their own welfare and may interpret the same behavior
from an interaction partner differently, as a sign of weakness. [43] Variability in
internal logical and activities that motivate farmers in particular makes a ”one-
size-fits-all” strategy impossible. [44] Previous work has shown the potential for
social cues to contribute to behavioral flexibility, influencing the way individu-
als react to their environments. Performance based imitation, copying actions of
those who are seen to do well, is an observed phenomenon known as social sam-
pling. [45] Social cues within a computer simulated maze experiment were seen
to dramatically increase the adoption of novel behavior patterns. [46] Research
describing changes in operational level biosecurity compliance behavior as a result
of social cues is not currently available. Identifying that social cues have an effect
on operational biosecurity compliance could aid decision makers at the tactical
and strategic level as they seek to increase compliance with protocols.
We developed a novel experimental variable to treat, based on the framework
of the serious game designed by Merrill et al. [30], in which participants were
confronted with a compliance decision related to a common biosecurity practice,
usually referred to as showering in-and-out. The shower-in, shower-out biosecu-
rity practice, a component of the line of separation biosecurity protocol, involves
changing clothes and showering before entering or exiting areas with livestock to
reduce transmission of disease between animals within a facility and the outside
environment. The practice is known to be highly effective at reducing the risk of
infection. [11] However, workers may neglect, avoid, or insufficiently complete the
practice due to the time it takes to use it. [19]. For example, effectively showering
multiple times a day is time consuming and may be perceived to have negative
repercussions such as damaging one’s hair and skin or inhibiting completion of
daily tasks. We developed novel experimental scenarios that tested participants’
willingness to comply with the shower biosecurity practice. Specifically, we placed
individuals into a farming situation where they were asked to make a binary biose-
curity decision. By using the shower practice, participants incurred an associated
time cost, but they avoided the potential risk of an infection. Here we hypothe-
size (H1) that when provided a social cue, in this case a biosecurity behavior of
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a coworker, individuals may react by mimicking or doing the opposite of the cue;
but regardless are more likely to change their behavior in response to the cue,
than if they did not receive the cue.
Experimental variables manipulated the following factors: (1) the risk of ac-
quiring an infection, (2) the delivery method of the infection risk, either a nu-
merical (Numeric) value or a graphical threat gauge style image (Graphical),
and (3) behavior of an automated coworker in the facility, either demonstrat-
ing compliance (Compliance by Coworker), demonstrating non-compliance (Non-
Compliance by Coworker), or not demonstrating (Coworker Control). In addition
to the three primary drivers of behavior, infection risk, message delivery method,
and social cue; we also looked for an additional secondary driver of behavior,
temporally-based psychological distancing. While we expect that participants
will increase compliance in response to an infection event, this tendency to com-
ply is likely to decrease as time passes. [16, 18, 42] Referred to as a psychological
distance effect, Merrill et al. [30] found that compliance did increase directly after
an infection, but the effect decreased with time after the infection. We hypothe-
sized (H2) that compliance would increase directly after an infection event, and
temporally-based psychological distancing would occur defined by a decrease in
compliance with increasing time since an infection.
2 Methods
2.1 Deployment
We conducted a single experiment to examine human behavioral responses to
social cues in a simulated production facility. Participants were recruited using
the online workplace Amazon Mechanical Turk, which has been identified as a
representative sample for the U.S. population [47], and a viable alternative to
traditional data collection [48]. Recruits were informed that their pay would be
based on performance during the experiment. Before the experiment commenced,
an informational slideshow was displayed explaining the purpose of the study and
mechanics of the game. This was followed by a screen allowing the recruit to
choose between proceeding to play the game or declining to participate. Insti-
tutional Review Board approved practices were followed for an experiment using
human participants (University of Vermont IRB # CHRBSS-16-232-IRB).
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2.2 Experiment Design
The simulated pork production facility was built using the Unity Development
Platform (Unity Technologies, Version 5.6.3) and hosted online using WebGL [49].
Each participant acted as a worker and was provided information in the form of
treatments that differed by combination of experimental variables: the risk of
infection if they chose not to comply, the delivery method of the infection risk
message, and behavior of a coworker present with them in the simulated facility.
With the provided treatment information, participants were confronted with a
choice to use the shower biosecurity practice or bypass the practice to avoid costs
associated with usage of the practice. Each round lasting up to 70 seconds(s)
represented one work day, 9am to 6pm. The experiment began with one practice
round, followed by 18 rounds of incentivized play.
Figure 1: Screenshot of a game round showing infection risk delivered as a numer-
ical (Numeric) message, the participant-controlled worker, automated coworker,
coins (internal tasks), the shower biosecurity practice (blue arrow) and emergency
exit (red arrow).
To act as a worker in the facility, the participant used the computer keyboard.
Each round, the worker began inside the facility. Tasks, represented as spinning
coins, appeared every 2 s. When the participant moved their worker to a coin, they
earned $1 experimental dollar. Once during each round, a high-value task would
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appear outside the virtual facility. The value for attending to this outside task was
based on the time it took to accomplish, starting at $30 experimental dollars and
decreasing by $1 experimental dollar per second. To earn the experimental dollars
for completing this high-value task, participants chose to comply and use the
shower biosecurity practice which required extra time both exiting and entering
the facility (with an approximate observed cost of $8.67 experimental dollars), or
avoid compliance by using the emergency exit, which carried no associated time
costs but risked infection of the facility’s swine.
More specifically, across all treatments participants were asked to leave the fa-
cility to complete an outside task and were confronted with the decision of how to
leave the facility, either by complying with the biosecurity practice or by skipping
the practice and leaving through the emergency exit. If participants decided to
use the shower biosecurity practice and ”comply”, participants activated a five-
second counter that simulated the time it takes to shower and change clothes.
After 5 s the virtual worker could exit the shower and complete the outside task.
The same procedure, with another 5 s delay, was repeated upon re-entry of the fa-
cility post-task completion. If the participant decided on non-compliance with the
shower biosecurity practice, and thus, left the facility through the emergency exit,
they incurred no time cost, but there was an associated chance of infection based
on the actual infection risk probability during the given round. The risk of using
the emergency exit was quantified using the infection information presented to
the participant, which varied by treatment (see Table 1 for breakdown of informa-
tion provided to participants by experimental variable and associated treatment
levels). If an infection occurred, calculated using a pseudorandom number gen-
erator, the round ended immediately, and the participant lost $50 experimental
dollars as well as any expected payout they had collected during the round. If an
infection did not occur, the round continued until the normal end of the workday.
The mean observed opportunity cost of using the shower practice as opposed to
the emergency exit was calculated to be $8.67 experimental dollars, due to the
time lost that could have been used to complete the outside task more quickly
and collect coins inside the facility upon reentry.
In addition to the participant’s worker, an automated coworker was included
in all simulation scenarios to provide implicit social cues to the player. The only
explicit information given to the participants regarding the coworker was during
the pre-game slide show (see Supplementary Materials) where they read that
there may be another worker in the facility with them. The automated coworker
was completely predetermined in its actions, exhibiting one of three behaviors in
any given round: 1) compliance with the shower biosecurity practice, 2) use of
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the emergency exit, or 3) not exiting the facility (Control). During the coworker
compliance and non-compliance treatments, participants would see the decision
made by the coworker, before they made their own decision to use the shower
biosecurity practice or the emergency exit. This demonstration by the coworker,
an implicit social cue, was intended to be observed by the participant with the
potential to affect their decision to comply.
After each round, the number of experimental dollars earned within the round
was displayed on the participant’s screen. In addition, a cumulative sum of the
total experimental dollars earned thus far in the experiment was displayed. At
the end of the 18 experimental rounds, participants received $1 U.S. for each $350
experimental dollars plus a base pay of $3.00 U.S.
2.3 Experimental Variables and Treatments
Experimental variables were designed to test factors shown to influence human
behavior: risk of infection, message delivery method, and social cue. Participants
were confronted with infection risk, delivered in different message formats, at the
start of each round. This infection risk information was used by the participant
during the round when they chose to either comply with the shower biosecurity
protocol, or risk using the emergency exit for a slightly higher payout. The
infection risk information was delivered numerically (e.g., ”5% infection risk”), or
graphically using a threat gauge (Figure 2).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Start of round infection risk delivered as a graphical (Graphical) mes-
sage; two arrows, one fixed, the other moving, were used to convey a best estimate
and uncertainty around that estimate (a). Start of round infection risk delivered
as a numerical (Numeric) message (b).
In the original work of Merrill et al. [30], the certainty of the disease risk infor-
mation and the message delivery method were both treated as separate variables.
When disease infection risk was treated with certainty, participants were provided
a single infection probability. Disease infection risk was treated with uncertainty
by providing a best estimate of the infection probability in addition to a range
of potential values. It was determined that numerical values with certainty were
the most likely to be associated with avoidance of the biosecurity practice, and
graphical threat gauge style images with uncertainty were the best at increasing
willingness to comply. [30] In order to increase our sample size per treatment,
we utilized only these two types of message delivery methods: numeric with cer-
tainty, and graphical with uncertainty, respectively. Hereafter, these are referred
to as Numeric and Graphical.
For our novel social cue experimental variable, an automated coworker demon-
strated one of three behaviors prior to the participant’s decision to comply. Unbe-
knownst to the participant, the compliance decision chosen by the coworker was
predetermined by treatment. Coworker demonstration of compliance involved the
automated coworker using the shower biosecurity practice; likewise, the coworker
demonstration of non-compliance involved the coworker using the emergency exit.
No demonstration, the control treatment, indicates that the coworker never left
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the facility.
In summary, the experiment had three infection risk treatments: (very low
(1%), to low (5%), to medium (15%)), two infection risk messaging treatments
(Numeric and Graphical), and three social cue treatments (Compliance by Coworker,
Non-Compliance by Coworker, and Coworker Control). A complete block design
was utilized, in which data were collected for every combination of the three ex-
perimental variables and their associated levels. Two additional variables were
also used in this experiment. First, the psychological distance effect, to identify
changes in behavior related to experiencing infection events. The distancing effect
was quantified by simply counting the number of rounds since an infection event
occurred. Second, because the experiment takes place in a series of rounds, we
used a variable referred to as play order to control for within-experiment learn-
ing. [50]
Treatment N
Infection Risk: 1% (Very Low) 648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)
Infection Risk: 5% (Low) 648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)
Infection Risk: 15% (Medium) 648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)
Message Delivery Method:
Numeric (”1%,” ”5%,” or ”15%”)
972 (9 rounds * 108 participants)
Message Delivery Method:
Graphical (A threat gauge with
arrows used to indicate risk)
972 (9 rounds * 108 participants)
Social Cue:
Compliance by Coworker
648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)
Social Cue:
Non-Compliance by Coworker
648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)
Social Cue:
Coworker Control
648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)
Table 1: Experiment treatments.
2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 Linear effects
The response variable in our experiment is binary, either the participant used the
shower biosecurity practice, or avoided compliance by using the emergency exit.
To explain the response variable, a set of mixed-effect logistic regression candidate
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models were generated using the statistical programming language, R. [51–53] The
set of candidate models included mixtures of experimental variables (Table 1),
interaction terms between experimental variables, as well as predictor variables:
(1) psychological distance, and (2) play order. Participant was added as a random
effect in all models to account for variation between individuals. To identify the
model of best fit, we used an information theoretic approach to test how well each
of our candidate models explains the data. [54, 55] Models were evaluated using
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), where the lowest AIC value indicates the
most parsimonious candidate model that best explains variation in the response
variable with the fewest parameterized variables. [56]
2.4.2 Ratio of variances
Nonlinear effects resulting from inconsistent responses to the social cue experi-
mental variable are identified in a separate examination of the strategy variance
components. Here we quantify strategic variability by calculating how an individ-
ual changed their compliance strategy between the three social cue treatments:
compliance, non-compliance, and control. Due to our complete block experiment
design, we can isolate an individual’s average compliance in response to any one
of our three social cue treatments by averaging over the other two experimen-
tal variables: infection risk and message delivery method. Having identified an
individual’s average compliance strategy for each of the three social cue treat-
ments they were presented, we then calculate the differences in strategy between
each of the three pairs of social cue treatments (compliance vs. non-compliance,
compliance vs. control, non-compliance vs. control). For example, how did an
individual’s average compliance change between all rounds in which they were pre-
sented the social cue compliance treatment, versus all rounds they were presented
with the social cue non-compliance treatment.
After quantifying individuals’ strategic variability using changes in average
compliance, we can aggregate all participants’ average compliance changes into
distributions, grouped by the pairs of social cue treatments between which indi-
viduals’ may have collectively changed their average behavior. The variance of
each of the three distributions can be evaluated in relation to one-another as ra-
tios of variances, which quantify differences in strategic variability observed over
all individuals. Confidence intervals were calculated using an F-test to determine
if any of the ratio of variances are statistically significant.
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3 Results
Data were collected from 108 participants for the experiment, the average payout
was $5.62 U.S. with a minimum of $4.32 U.S. and a maximum of $6.45 U.S. From
the set of mixed-effect logistic regression candidate models, the model with the
lowest AIC, Model 1, was selected as the best supported candidate model and used
for reported statistical inference from the experiment (Table 2). Model 1 included
the fixed effects psychological distance, message delivery method, infection risk,
and play order, in addition to participant as a random effect. ∆AIC quantifies the
loss of information if a different candidate model is used. Neither the social cue
experimental variable nor interaction effects were included in the AIC-selected
best candidate model. Interaction effects between experimental variables were
not found to be significant in any of the candidate models generated.
Model PD M IR PO SC M*IR M*SC SC*IR AIC ∆AIC
1 X X X X 1495 0
3 X X X X X 1495 0.280
2 X X X X X 1498 3.081
7 X X X X X X 1499 3.383
4 X X X X X X 1502 6.764
5 X X X X X 1505 10.195
6 X X X X X X 1506 10.523
Table 2: Candidate Models reordered by AIC value with the best AIC-selected
models listed first. Independent variables: Psychological Distance (PD), Message
Delivery Method (M), Infection Risk (IR), Play Order (PO) and Social Cue (SC).
Interaction terms e.g. Message Delivery Method by Infection Risk are denoted as
(M*IR).
The models use a linear combination of the random and fixed effects to obtain
logit coefficients that predict the response variable, or the probability (from 0 to
1), that the participant would comply with the shower biosecurity practice. We
exponentiated the logit coefficients to generate odds ratios, which were used to
evaluate the odds that an individual will opt to use the shower biosecurity practice
as opposed to the emergency exit. An odds ratio of 1:1, presented as 1, indicated
that there are even odds for either outcome. If an odds ratio confidence interval
excluded one, the variable was considered significant. Odds ratios that were
greater than 1 indicated that it was significantly more likely that the participant
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complied with the shower practice than used the emergency exit; ratios below 1
indicated it was more likely the participant used the emergency exit.
Results from the logistic regression quantify the model-predicted probability
that the participant will comply with the shower biosecurity practice. Presented
as odds ratios in Table 3, the first row represents the baseline odds ratio (inter-
cept) associated with the treatment combination of 5% infection risk delivered
using a Graphical message. The 66.536 odds ratio (intercept) signifies partici-
pants are 66.536 times as likely to use the shower biosecurity practice as opposed
to the emergency exit when provided with the Graphical message at the 5% infec-
tion risk level. The rest of the odds ratios in Table 3 are compared to the baseline,
intercept ratio. For example, participants that received the infection risk informa-
tion as a Numeric message as opposed to the intercept message delivery method
(Graphical), had an odds ratio of 0.095. Therefore, participants receiving a Nu-
meric message were 0.095 times as likely to use the shower biosecurity practice,
or 10.526 times as likely to use the emergency exit, than participants receiving a
Graphical message. No conclusion can be drawn about how predictor variables
affect compliance decisions if the odds ratio confidence interval includes 1. We
found significant main effects (Table 3, Figure 3).
Parameter Odds ratio Lower bound Upper bound P-value
Intercept
(Graphical Message,
Infection Risk @ 5%)
66.536 22.729 194.774 <0.001
Psychological Distance 0.120 0.048 0.299 <0.001
Numeric Message 0.095 0.068 0.134 <0.001
Infection Risk @ 15% 20.100 12.885 31.353 <0.001
Infection Risk @ 1% 0.116 0.081 0.165 <0.001
Play Order 0.976 0.949 1.004 0.090
Table 3: Results of the selected best fit mixed-effect logistic regression model
(Model 1; see Table 2). Depicted here are the odds ratios for fixed effects de-
scribing relationships with the binary response variable: compliance with the
biosecurity practice. Bold values indicate significance at α = 0.05.
3.1 Main Effects
Average compliance increased with increasing infection risk from 1% (34% com-
pliance) to 5% (60% compliance) to 15% (89% compliance) (Figure 3 Left Panel).
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Compliance was also much higher when the infection risk message was delivered
as a Graphical message (73% compliance) vs. as a Numeric message (49% com-
pliance) (Figure 3 Right Panel).
Figure 3: Summary results of the main treatment effects. Box-plot of the proba-
bility of using the shower biosecurity practice by the main effects, Message Deliv-
ery Method and Infection Risk. Lower and upper box boundaries 25th and 75th
percentiles, respectively, line inside box median, overlaid on model predicted data
values.
3.2 Individual Differences (H1)
Strategic variability of individual behavior was quantified to determine if the
coworker social cues elicited any measurable response. The social cue variable
was not included in the AIC-selected best candidate model (Table 2). This in-
dicated that individuals did not respond in a consistent or linear way to the
coworker demonstrations, so the information gained by including the social cue
variable did not explain enough information to overcome the penalty for inclusion
of an additional parameterized variable. While the changes in compliance were
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not consistent across participants, we sought to discover if the coworker behavior
influenced the strategies used by the participants. We identified the strategic
variability of individuals by quantifying their change in average compliance when
confronted by the different coworker behaviors. Controlling for the effects of the
infection risk and message delivery method experimental variables, we calculate
individual changes in average compliance between the three social cue treatments:
Compliance by Coworker, Non-Compliance by Coworker, and Coworker Control.
Specifically, we identify the distributions of average changes in compliance be-
tween the three combinations of these treatments: Compliance by Coworker vs.
Non-Compliance by Coworker, Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control,
and Non-Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control (Figure 4). This allowed
us to test if the strategy space was distributed differently between the social cue
treatments.
Figure 4: Violin with inlaid box-plots of individuals’ changes in average compli-
ance between coworker treatments. Lower and upper box boundaries 25th and
75th percentiles, respectively, line inside box median.
Change in average compliance, normalized to span from -1 to 1, represented
the degree to which an individual changed their compliance strategy between two
types of social cue treatments. Of particular interest was whether participants
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altered their strategies when observing a coworker exiting the production facility
(either following protocols or not) as contrasted with the strategies they employed
when the coworker never left the facility. The greatest strategic variability was
observed in the changes of compliance between Compliance by Coworker treat-
ments and Non-Compliance by Coworker treatments (Figure 4, Left-most violin
with inlaid box-plot). In this case, participants with a positive change in com-
pliance (e.g. increasing compliance from a base rate), falling above the y=0 line,
were complying with the shower biosecurity practice more often during Compli-
ance by Coworker treatments, when compared with Non-Compliance by Coworker
treatments. However, there were also individuals doing the opposite; participants
falling below the y = 0 line were complying more often during Non-Compliance by
Coworker treatments, when compared with Compliance by Coworker treatments.
To evaluate the relative change in variance between the three distributions of
compliance strategies (Figure 4), we enumerated their ratio of variances (Table
4).
Ratio of variances
Compliance by Coworker vs.
Non-Compliance by Coworker
0.040 1.496 1.680
Compliance by Coworker
vs. Coworker Control
0.027 1 1.123
Variance 0.027 0.024
Compliance by Coworker
vs. Coworker Control
Non-Compliance by Coworker
vs. Coworker Control
Table 4: Variance of changes in average compliance between the three combina-
tions of social normative behavior treatments. Ratios of variances quantify the
relative change in variance between two distributions.
To determine if any of the ratio of variances were statistically significant, confi-
dence intervals were calculated using an F-test (Table 5). A ratio was determined
to be significant if the confidence interval did not include 1. The top two rows
of Table 5 with significant p-values correspond to the increased variation in in-
dividual compliance strategies observed between the two explicit demonstrations
(Compliance by Coworker vs. Non-Compliance by Coworker); with respect to
compliance strategy variation between either of the two explicit demonstrations
and the baseline treatment (Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control, or
Non-Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control). This confirmed the hy-
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pothesis (H1) that participants would change their behavior using the social cues
presented to them. In this case the change in behavior came in the form of in-
creased strategic variability between either of the two explicit social cues with
respect to the control. The third row indicates there was not a significant dif-
ference in strategic variability between Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker
Control, and Non-Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control.
Paired Social Cue
Treatment Ratio
Ratio of
variances
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
P-value
(SC1 vs. SC2) / (SC1 vs. Control) 1.496 1.022 2.190 0.038
(SC1 vs. SC2) / (SC2 vs. Control) 1.680 1.148 2.459 0.008
(SC1 vs. Control) / (SC2 vs. Control) 1.123 0.767 1.643 0.550
Table 5: Results of F-test to calculate ratio of variances (Table 4) confidence
intervals. SC1 corresponds with Compliance by Coworker treatments, SC2 corre-
sponds with Non-Compliance by Coworker treatments, Control corresponds with
Coworker Control treatments. Bold indicates statistical significance, α = 0.05.
3.3 Psychological Distance (H3)
The results of the AIC-selected best fitting model from the experiment found
the psychological distance effect to be significant with an odds ratio of 0.120
(Table 3). This confirms (H2) that temporally-based psychological distancing
occurred by indicating that the probability that individuals complied with the
shower biosecurity practice increased directly after becoming infected, and the
effect decayed with time.
4 Discussion
The goal of our experiment was to investigate the effects of social cues in a
simulated pork production facility. Our study advances knowledge of how heuris-
tics [38], or affective reasoning [35, 36], may impact decisions made under time
pressure. We examined the effects of introducing social cues by testing for disease
infection risk, message delivery method, and social cues. Our results unveil the
potential impacts of social value orientation [43] by identifying effects of different
social cues at the operational level of biosecurity. Social cues were shown to have
a significant effect on the degree of strategic variability in compliance behavior
(H1). That is, people reacted and changed their behavior when they observed
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the coworker’s biosecurity decision as compared to when the coworker staying in
the facility for the entire working day. We also found evidence of a psychological
distance effect (H2), an increased likelihood to comply directly after an infection
event, an effect that decayed over time.
4.1 Limitations
Statistical sampling methods are often used to study selected groups and strata
of society, but they do carry the potential to introduce bias into an experiment
when the sampled population has marked differences from the target population.
For our study, we assume that results obtained using the online platform Amazon
Mechanical Turk can be extrapolated to the target population of swine industry
professionals. Amazon Mechanical Turk has been identified as a viable alternative
to traditional sampling methods like surveys [48], and is also characterized as a
more representative sample of the U.S. national population than either college
undergraduate or internet samples in general [47]. Although limited research
exists to compare the differences between swine industry workers and the general
population, an experiment by Clark et al. [29] did not detect a difference in the
distributions of risk behavioral strategies between a sample of online participants
and agricultural professionals. Farmers in particular exhibit variable responses
to stimuli due to the complexity of the decision-making process [44]; and because
they are operating under a variety of different objective functions a consistent
bias is unlikely.
Merrill et al. [30], specifically their second experiment, was the foundation
for the experiment within the current study. It is important to acknowledge the
differences in the current experiment, both to enhance replicability, as well as to
address any potential bias in comparison. In the current experiment with respect
to the work of Merrill et al. [30]: the linguistic message delivery treatment was
removed, the social cue experimental variable was introduced, the appearance of
the threat gauge was adjusted, the experiment had six fewer rounds, and each
round was approximately 10 seconds longer. Although the look of the threat gauge
was modified, the relatively consistent use of verbal demarcations (Low, Medium,
High), should preserve response to the graphical message across experiments.
4.2 Infection Risk
Infection risk has been determined to be the main driver of behavior both in this
current experiment, as well as the work of Merrill et al. [30]. In the study by Mer-
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rill et al. [30], participants were exposed to infection risk treatments of very low
(1%), low (5%), medium (15%) and high (25%). In the current experiment, the
high infection risk treatment with a 25% chance of infection was omitted because
Merrill et al. [30] observed near ubiquitous compliance at 25%, and we wanted to
increase our ability to detect differences in other signals, such as the social cue
experimental variable. Therefore, participants were only confronted with the very
low (1%), low (5%), and medium (15%) infection risk treatments. The change
in risk perception that could be attributed to the removal of the high infection
risk treatment can be seen when comparing average compliance in the current
experiment, with average compliance in analogous treatments from the experi-
ment of Merrill et al. [30] (Table 6). Here analogous refers to message delivery
method treatments in the experiment conducted by Merrill et al. [30] that were
replicated in the current experiment, numeric with certainty and graphical with
uncertainty; with message delivery method treatments that were not replicated,
e.g. numeric with uncertainty, omitted from comparison.
Infection
risk
Merrill et al.
frequency of
compliance (%)
Current study
frequency of
compliance (%)
∆ frequency of
compliance (%)
1 23.6 33.6 10.0
5 56.0 60.3 4.3
15 80.9 88.7 7.8
Average 53.5 60.9 7.4
Table 6: Change in observed frequency of use of the shower biosecurity practice
between original analogous treatments and current experiment treatments by in-
fection risk. ∆ frequency of compliance quantifies the change between the original
and current average compliance, positive values correspond to an increase in the
current study average compliance.
At analogous treatments in the experiment of Merrill et al. [30], average com-
pliance increased from 23.6% at very low infection risk, to 56.0% at low risk, to
80.9% at medium risk, to 91.0% at high risk. We found increased compliance
with the shower biosecurity practice in our experiment. In the current study, av-
erage compliance increased from 33.6% at very low infection risk, to 60.3% at low
infection risk, to 88.7% at medium infection risk. By removing the high infection
risk treatment, participants may have exhibited increased risk aversion in decision-
making because they were now using the medium infection risk treatment as their
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point of reference for maximum infection risk. This effect of reframing infection
risk is consistent with heuristics identified in risk perception literature [38,42]. It
is also possible that changes in observed compliance between experiments could
have been caused by the introduction of the social cue experimental variable. We
propose an additional experiment that utilizes our novel social cue experimental
variable, without omitting the 25% risk level. This potential future work could
discern some of these subtleties of risk communication strategies, and determine
if it was the introduction of the social cue, or the omission of the high infection
risk level, that caused the observed increase in compliance.
4.3 Individual Differences (H2)
By introducing the social cue variable into the experiment design, we hypothesized
that compliance behavior could be shifted by an implicit suggestion. In this case,
the social cue came from a coworker present in the facility with the participant.
We observed increased strategic variability by participants in their response to
compliance or non-compliance by the coworker, with respect to the control where
the coworker never exited. The behaviors of the automated coworker could have
changed how a participant perceived what is commonly done in the facility. Al-
though the automated coworker had no effect on the actual outcome of the round,
we expected the subtle hint of how the coworker handled the compliance decision
to be internalized in the decision-making process of participants. Humans are
known to let feelings and mental shortcuts guide the decision-making process,
especially when under time pressure. [35,36,38]
In our examination of the variability in the participants’ strategy space, we
established that individuals displayed significantly more variation in compliance
strategy when responding to two different explicit social behaviors: Compliance
by Coworker and Non-Compliance by Coworker. The social value orientation of
participants, associated with varying tendencies to cooperate or compete with
interaction partners, likely played a role in observed differences in strategic vari-
ability. [43] These differences could also be attributed to a mirroring or mimicry
effect; imitation based on social performance cues has been observed, although
in this experiment there was no effect on performance or payout related to the
cue. [45] This aligns with research identifying the impact of social cues on be-
havioral flexibility, leading to novel behavioral patterns. [46] Quantified as vari-
ance, or ratio of variances, having a significant increase indicates individuals were
changing, but not in a consistent way. One explanation is that individuals are
known to be motivated by a wide range of factors and internal logic. [44] The
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complex decision-making process in each individual may lead to varying degrees
of ”follower” or ”anti-follower” tendencies. If a worker in a facility sees their as-
sociate breaking the rules, are they more likely to pick up the slack and ”cover
for them”, or are they more likely to feel it is justified for them to break the rules
as well? One player who shared their strategy after the experiment stated they
would always use the shower biosecurity practice when the coworker was exiting
the emergency door to compensate/offset their coworker’s bad behavior. They
felt more inclined to shower in order to protect the farm from disease.
Identifying that social cues influence compliance strategy at the operational
level is a novel conclusion and lends credence and support to future studies of
worker culture. We recommend follow-up experiments with more explicit social
cues, e.g., where a coworker demonstration is paired with an associated expla-
nation of behavior communicated via a text bubble. For example, how would
pairing the coworker demonstration of compliance within this experiment with
an explicit verbal explanation from the coworker (e.g. ”Showering takes time,
but we are all in this together.”) affect behavior of participants? Another avenue
to further research effects of social cues on operational biosecurity compliance is
to replicate the current experiment in a virtual-reality based swine production
facility, in order to test if the results are consistent in a more immersive environ-
ment. Continuing to study how social cues can increase compliance, or induce
non-compliance, will be valuable for farm management, training, and monitoring.
4.4 Psychological Distance (H3)
In our experiment, individuals who had recently incurred a facility infection were
far more likely to comply with the shower biosecurity practice. Over time, mental
construal of events are expected to become more abstract and low-level, decreasing
their influence on future decisions. [17] In the context of this experiment, the
increased likelihood to comply directly after an infection event wore off over time.
This temporally based psychological distancing [16,18] was similarly observed by
Merrill et al. [30], where individuals who had just been infected were twice as likely
to comply as those who had never been infected. Our results therefore suggest
that it is important to acknowledge that temporal psychological distancing will
influence workers and the decrease in observed compliance should be combatted
such as with biosecurity trainings that are reinforced frequently.
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5 Conclusion
The human behavioral component of animal biosecurity is not well understood,
but worker decisions at the operational level have direct economic and sociological
consequences when an outbreak occurs. [6,15] For both managers and workers in
the swine industry, understanding how social cues are affecting compliance with
existing biosecurity protocols is critical. This study demonstrates the ability to
test hypotheses about human behavioral responses to social cues using experimen-
tal game simulations. We examined how a coworker demonstration can impact
the complex mental process occurring when participants chose to comply with
the simulated shower biosecurity practice in the experiment. We tested the effect
of an implicit social cue on decision-making; an attempt to subtly recreate the
worker culture in a facility. [33] While it is well known that workers do not al-
ways comply with operational-level protocols [15], there is no existing data that
shows how social cues may be impacting these biosecurity lapses. These findings
outline the significant variability in how people change their behavior in response
to those around them, even when others’ actions have no repercussions or effect
on monetary payout.
To summarize and extend these findings to be applicable at the facility level,
this work identifies that social cues will result in different compliance strategies
amongst workers in a swine facility. Behavior of others, even if not directly
impacting the worker, will impact their decision making. Providing this feedback
from the operational level can inform tactical and strategic decision makers as they
implement biosecurity protocols whose efficacy will depend on workers’ willingness
to comply, and attempt to create a workplace culture of compliance. Humans are
extremely complex, and while we acknowledge that there is no blanket solution
to increasing worker compliance, we believe small changes can have an impact on
the system level. Advancing knowledge and understanding of human behavioral
components of animal biosecurity has vast potential to increase worker and animal
welfare, shifting the industry towards disease-resiliency.
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